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Rousseau, Stiegler and the Aporia of Origin
Ben Roberts
In his recent work La technique et le temps (Technics and Time) the French philosopher Bernard 
Stiegler has tried to rethink the relationship between the human and what he calls “technics” (la  
technique). Stiegler uses this term to refer not only to modern technology but all “organised 
inorganic matter”, that is everything from ﬂint tools, through systems of writing, to modern tele-
communications. Stiegler sees technics as the “exteriorisation” or “invention” of the human: the 
human is constituted through the “prosthesis” of technical supports. Of the three volumes of La 
Technique et le temps that have so far appeared, the ﬁrst volume, La faute d’Épiméthée (1994), 
introduces the concept of technics and argues for understanding the origin of the human as the 
origin of technics.1 The second volume, La désorientation (1996), discusses two crucial shifts in the 
history of technics: the birth of “orthographic” writing and the emergence of tele-technologies 
which Stiegler thinks of as the “industrialisation of memory”.2 The third volume, Les temps du 
cinéma (2001), develops Stiegler’s argument about the industrialisation of memory in relation to 
cinema.3 
Stiegler’s work can be seen as strongly indebted to that of Jacques Derrida. This is evident in 
two ways. Firstly, Stiegler incorporates and creatively transforms a number of key Derridean 
themes such as différance, supplementarity (which Stiegler pushes is the direction of a general 
theory of the technical “supplement”), and “aporia”. In particular he sees his work on technics as 
developing Derrida’s “logic of the supplement” into a “history of the supplement”.4 Secondly, 
Stiegler generates his thesis through a deconstructive reading of philosophical and historical 
thinking on technology. One example of the latter which we will examine here is his reading of 
Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. 
The immediate context of Stiegler’s discussion of Rousseau is the chapter entitled “Technology 
and Anthropology” in the ﬁrst volume of Technics and Time. In some respects what is at stake in 
this section of the ﬁrst volume, as Richard Beardsworth suggests in his reading of Stiegler, is to 
bring out the “aporia of origin” that is at work in any anthropological discussion of the origins of 
the human, whether transcendental or empirical.5 Stiegler is trying to show here that such an aporia 
is inseparable from the question of technics. He makes this case through a reading of two forms of 
anthropology. One form is that of the French palaeo-anthropologist Leroi-Gourhan whose work, for 
Stiegler, makes tremendous gains in terms of understanding the close relationship between the 
origin of the human and the origin of tools. Leroi-Gourhan, however, ultimately fails to understand 
the aporia at work in the relationship between the ‘who’ (the early human) and the ‘what’ (tools); he 
therefore does not, on Stiegler’s reading, see that the ‘invention of the human’ can have its origin in 
neither.6 The other form of anthropology that Stiegler turns to — and it is this reading that we are 
concerned with here — is that of Rousseau, which Stiegler regards as transcendental anthropology. 
The signiﬁcance of these readings for Stiegler’s wider project is that he aims to show that in both 
empirical anthropology (Leroi-Gourhan) and transcendental anthropology (Rousseau) there is an 
aporia of origin at work and that a thinking of this aporia is inseparable from thinking technics. 
Stiegler is therefore not interested in criticising the anthropology of Leroi-Gourhan and Rousseau in 
order to advance an alternative anthropological account; rather, he reads them deconstructively in 
order to ﬁnd the aporia of origin that is already at work in their texts. 
It is no surprise that in his discussion of technology and anthropology Stiegler should turn to 
Rousseau, whom Leroi-Gourhan himself criticises7 and who is also, as Stiegler puts it, “…the pivot 
between the anthropological question promoted to philosophical rank and the beginning of scientiﬁc 
anthropological theory”.8 The justiﬁcation for regarding Rousseau in this pivotal role is on the one 
hand Lévi-Strauss’s positioning of him as the “father of anthropological science”9 and, on the other, 
Nietzsche’s targeting of him as an example of the mistake a philosophical anthropology makes 
when it thinks the human on the basis of an “eternal man”, rather than as a ﬁgure in a continuous 
state of becoming.10 Stiegler’s reading of Rousseau is centred on the latter’s Discourse on the  
Origin of Inequality among Men. Stiegler is not interested in Rousseau’s arguments about 
inequality per se, but rather the “anthropological” aspects of Rousseau’s Discourse. Rousseau’s 
investigation of the origin of inequality seems to be inseparable from an investigation into the 
“nature” of the human. As Rousseau puts it, “how shall we know the source of inequality between 
men, if we do not begin by knowing mankind?".11 In this sense the question of the origin of 
inequality is equally the question of the origin of the human. 
Stiegler argues that, despite being for Lévi-Strauss the founder of modern scientiﬁc 
anthropological discourse, Rousseau’s is an unapologetically transcendental anthropology. That is 
to say, Rousseau’s conjectural history of the origin begins by excluding facts in the form of man’s 
actual history. As Rousseau puts it: 
Let us begin by laying facts aside, as they do not affect the question. The investigations 
we may enter into, in treating the subject, must not be considered as historical truths, 
but only as mere conditional and hypothetical reasonings, rather calculated to explain 
the nature of things, than to ascertain their actual origin; just like the hypotheses which 
our physicists daily form respecting the formation of the world.12
This “laying facts aside” (“écarter tous les faits”) is necessary because in order to ﬁnd the origin of 
inequality one must ﬁrst regress to a point before the origin of human history, that is one must 
distinguish the “natural” man from the artiﬁce of culture and society. That such a natural man, as 
Rousseau concedes, “perhaps never did exist” does not take away from the need to “distinguish 
properly between what is original and what is artiﬁcial in the actual nature of man”.13 As Stiegler 
comments, in order to set up the argument that originally there was no difference among men, i.e., 
no inequality, Rousseau must assert that there is a difference between the originary “natural” man 
and the modern “fallen” man (“This discourse against difference passes therefore in turn through a 
differentiation; this is a discourse for difference as well. There is not difference at the origin, but 
originary equality: we must, but afterward, make an originary difference between what the origin is 
and what it no longer is …”).14 Moreover, since the undifferentiated origin is to be arrived at by 
distinguishing what is “artiﬁcial” from what is “natural” it might seem slightly curious that one can 
only arrive at this origin through the artiﬁce of a ﬁctional origin, of a “natural” man that “perhaps 
never did exist”. Stiegler comments: 
At its limit, speech calls for a “special” discourse: to distinguish, in man’s nature, the 
original from the artiﬁcial, even if they have never been distinguished in fact, even if 
this state of distinction of the original and the artiﬁcial never was, never existed, a 
ﬁction will be related, a story told if not a myth — we are not in Greece but the 
approach of the Discourse is comparable to that of Socrates to Meno [Stiegler is 
referring to the myth of anamnesis which is Socrates” response to Meno’s paradox 
about the origin of knowledge]. A distinction will be related to save the principle from 
the fact — from the fact of force and from the force of fact. But what is a ﬁction, if not 
an artiﬁce? An artiﬁce will be needed to distinguish the artiﬁcial from the natural.15
Of course it might well be argued against this reading that even though Rousseau begins by “laying 
facts aside”, he in fact reintroduces them through his constant references to what looks like factual 
evidence (for example, travellers contact with “primitive” peoples in other parts of the world).16 
However, the context for the introduction of these facts in practice is a discourse which does not 
cede them precedence in principle; Rousseau argues repeatedly from the very beginning of the 
Discourse that one cannot arrive at the what is necessary to man (the “natural”) except by excluding 
the contingent. As Rousseau poses the problem in his preface: 
For how shall we know the source of inequality among men, if we do not begin by 
knowing mankind? And how shall man hope to see himself as nature made him, across 
all the changes which the succession of place and time must have produced in his 
original constitution? How can we distinguish what is fundamental in his nature from 
the changes and additions which his circumstances and the advances he has made have 
introduced to modify his primitive condition?17
Rousseu’s discourse positions, in effect, man’s nature on the side of necessity and human history on 
the side of contingency. Thus even if Rousseau is happy to introduce “empirical” evidence into his 
argument, it is within an investigation into nature or natural necessity that must appear 
transcendental in its mode of argumentation. The need to isolate the natural from the artiﬁcial 
paradoxically requires that we exclude the, as it were, natural self-evidence of empirical facts. 
Stiegler thus argues that while Rousseau occasionally appears to have recourse to empirical history 
in the Discourse, this evidence is never the foundation of his argument: 
The Caribs of Venezuela are this mythico-real ﬁgure — an obviously problematic 
reference since Rousseau does not intend to found his discourse on factual reality. But 
the Carib is not a simple fact, and Rousseau does not appeal to him as proof: he ﬁnds in 
him a source of inspiration …; an already corrupted ﬁgure of the origin, he suggests the 
origin nevertheless, without ever revealing it.18
This, then, is the gambit of Stiegler’s reading: conjectural history is to actual history as the 
transcendental is to the empirical. In order to understand how things necessarily are we must in fact 
put to one side contingent human reality. Stiegler’s reading here is also to be found in Ernst 
Cassirer, who argues of Rousseau as follows: 
In Raynal’s Histoire philosophique et politique d’établissemens et du commerce des  
Européens dans les deux Indes (1772) the eighteenth century found an inexhaustible 
mine of information about “exotic” conditions and an arsenal for their enthusiastic 
praise. When Rousseau wrote the Discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité, this movement 
was already under full way; but he himself seems hardly touched by it. He made it 
unmistakably clear right at the beginning of that essay that he neither could nor wanted 
to describe a historically demonstrable state of mankind …“The nature of things” is 
present to us everywhere — to understand it we need not retrace our steps through the 
millenia, to the sparse and undependable evidence of prehistoric times. […] The true 
knowledge of man cannot be found in ethnography or ethnology. There is only one 
living source for this knowledge — the source of self-knowledge and genuine self-
examination. And it is to this alone that Rousseau appeals.19
This exclusion of actual history and the investigation of nature as necessity is, for Stiegler, basically 
a transcendental argument. The special status of this discourse, this conjectural history, as Rousseau 
acknowledges himself, is thus found in the possibility of making this “ﬁctional” distinction: how 
can we make such a distinction when we are already immersed in artiﬁce, in society and culture? 
The answer is that we must listen to “the voice of nature” which can be heard immediately without 
the necessity of recourse to experimentation or reasoning (both of which are not natural, being the 
hallmarks of man after the fall).20 Stiegler comments: 
The natural is immediately there in original evidence …The guide, the light for having 
access to this original immediacy, the exclusive possibility of returning to the source 
through a questioning back, is evidence as such, self-presence, that which remains 
inside, does not pass through the outside, through the artiﬁce of cultural, worldly 
judgements …The most originary is the most familiar, the closest, and therefore, the 
most removed, the most hidden. The usual structure: the simplest is the most 
imperceptible.21
The distinction that Rousseau seeks is thus for Stiegler the classic move of transcendental 
philosophy. What he calls here “the usual structure” is also to be found, Stiegler comments, in 
Aristotle’s comments about ﬁsh that, living in water, “would not notice that things which touch one 
another in water have wet surfaces” and the comment in Plato’s Timaeus that, as Stiegler 
paraphrases, “if the world were made of gold, gold would be the only thing that we could not know, 
since there would be nothing for us to oppose it to …no notion of it and yet gold would be the only 
thing we would truly know, for only gold would be in truth, the truth of all beings, being itself”.22 
(Perhaps surprisingly, given the direction of his thesis, Stiegler does not mention here the obvious 
analogy with onto-ontological difference in Heidegger where Dasein is what is ontically closest to 
us yet ontologically furthest away.23 On the other hand what Stiegler is calling here the “usual 
structure” could perhaps equally be applied to the trajectory of Stiegler’s own thesis to the extent to 
which it aims to think a technological life in which modernity is immersed but which remains 
relatively unthought.) 
The other important aspect of Rousseau’s ﬁction concerning the nature of man is the explicit way 
in which it opposes nature as the invariant being to the contingent variations of custom and society 
as becoming. This also, as Stiegler points out, excludes the zoological or palaeo-anthropological 
account of evolutionary change in nature itself and indeed Rousseau at an early point in the 
Discourse decides to exclude a “comparative anatomy” which has made “too little progress” in 
favour of the supposition of an originary man who has “always walked on two legs, made use of 
hands as we do”.24 Rousseau’s assumption that at the origin man already walked erect and made use 
of his hands might seem slightly odd given that “…[for man] to make use of his hands, no longer to 
have paws is to manipulate — and what hands manipulate are tools and instruments”.25 For a large 
part of the Discourse is given over, at Stiegler points out at some length, to the argument that the 
fall from the state of nature (and hence, equality) is due to man’s increasing reliance on tools and 
external supports. Originary man has no need of tools because, living like an animal, he ﬁnds nature 
abundant: “I see him satisfying his hunger at the ﬁrst oak, and slaking his thirst at the ﬁrst brook: 
ﬁnding his bed at the foot of the tree which afforded him a repast; and with that, all his wants 
supplied”.26 Stiegler argues: “Considering originary man as walking on two feet and making use of 
his hands therefore contradicts what follows in the text …originary man is originary only because 
he is not contaminated by the artiﬁcial, the mediate, the technical and the prosthetic”.27 The point 
for Rousseau is to demonstrate that original man is lacking nothing and therefore has no need of any 
artiﬁce or prosthesis, which for Stiegler, following Leroi-Gourhan, makes a nonsense of his 
anatomical speciﬁcity.28 For Rousseau, the originary man has no need of tools because he still 
retains a bestial strength of which his later dependence on industry will deprive him. Likewise 
medicine is a technical aid which is ultimately to the detriment of that which it is meant to heal. 
(Stiegler comments that medicine is “as always, the paradigm of human artiﬁce” and refers readers 
to the argument around writing in Plato.)29 The emergence of tools and external aids, i.e., technics, 
marks a deviation from nature and hence the origin of inequality.30 The savage, like the animal, has 
no need of medicine or tools to boost his strength. Rather, as Stiegler explains, for Rousseau: 
This is an accident taking place after nature, after the origin, as a second origin, drawing 
man away from what the origin originally prescribed. This accident is the origin of 
remedies, prostheses, drugs — the origin of the fall and the second origin. It is an 
exterior accident, which does not come from the nature of man: it happens to him and 
denaturalises him.31
Nonetheless — crucially — originary man is not simply an animal. Effectively what differentiates 
him is free will. Unlike the animal, which Rousseau sees as equivalent to the clockwork toy,32 man 
has “spirit” which allows him to deviate from the program or to choose. For the original man this is 
an advantage — the example given by Rousseau and highlighted by Stiegler is that of being able to 
choose between eating fruit or grain or meat whereas “a pigeon would be starved to death by the 
sight of a dish of the choicest meats, and a cat on a heap of fruit or grain”33 — but it is also, in a 
sense, the possibility of man’s fall from a state of nature. As Robert Wokler puts it: 
Rousseau also supposed, however, that mankind had a unique capacity to change its 
nature. While every other species of animal has been provided by Nature with the 
instincts and capacities needed to sustain its life, human beings are by contrast free 
agents, capable of choice. Unlike animals, always enslaved by their appetites, we are 
endowed with free will […] He thought it was because humans in their natural state 
were able to make themselves distinct from other animals, rather than because they were 
endowed with any speciﬁc or distinctive attributes from the beginning, that our 
forebears must always have had an advantage over every other type of creature.34
It is precisely this capacity of human’s “in their natural state” to “make themselves distinct from 
other animals” that makes Rousseau’s account so fascinating for Stiegler. On the one hand, at the 
origin, as Stiegler points out, man is at one with nature and therefore has no need to deviate from it; 
deviation is therefore an “accident” or improvidence that will have to come from outside. On the 
other hand, the freedom to choose is, as the freedom to deviate from the program of nature, the very 
possibility of the fall, that is, of the development of tools, cultivation, enclosure of land and so on. 
Stiegler argues as follows: 
The possibility of such a deviation is thus inscribed on the inside of the origin itself. The 
man of pure nature had no reason to deviate from the origin. But he nevertheless had the 
possibility …The presentation of human freedom is thus negative, for at issue here is 
man after the fall, not the man of pure nature. In this case [i.e., before the fall from a 
state of nature], freedom would indeed have been an advantage: it would have allowed 
man to partake of fruit in the absence of meat, of meat where there was no fruit, of grain 
in the absence of both meat and fruit.35
What Rousseau calls “perfectibility’, that is, the possibility of an exercise of freedom in the 
deviation from nature is therefore, for Stiegler, present at the origin, but only “virtually” (“en 
puissance”).36 As soon as the virtual possibility at the origin — a possibility proper to originary man 
— is actualised, it upsets or deviates from the origin. Stiegler observes: “Spirit proper to man, his 
nature, his being, his origin, is nevertheless what will upset the state of pure nature”.37 Spirit is 
therefore to be compared with technics as the origin (or non-origin) of the technical prosthesis that 
deviates from nature: 
Technics, as the power of man, is what destroys in its actualisation that of which it is the 
power. But if this comparison is valid, this would mean that power, that is, technics, is 
in the origin, is the origin as possibility of deviation qua the absence of origin …The 
origin is the origin only insofar as it opposed the fall as a possibility by deferring it, 
whereas the fall is the realisation of the origin, its becoming-real, its passage into 
actuality (the actualisation of the power it is), being simultaneously, by the same token, 
its derealisation, its disappearance or its oblivion — and a differentiation erasing 
original equality.38
The paradox, for Stiegler, thus appears to be that the origin just is its own disappearance as origin: 
its appearing, its realisation, is its disappearing. Natural man, at the origin, does not deviate from 
nature, but at the same time he deﬁnes himself (in relation to animals) by this “virtual” possibility of 
his deviation from nature. Stiegler summarises this apparently aporetic structure as follows: 
There is no difference between man (in his essence) and animal, no essential difference 
between man and animal, unless it be an actual possibility. When there is a difference, 
man is no longer, and this is his denaturalisation, that is, the naturalisation of the animal. 
Man is his disappearance in the denaturalisation of his essence. Appearing, he 
disappears: his essence defaults [son essence se fait défaut]. By accident …Man is the 
accident of automobility caused by a default of essence [une panne d’essence, a “lack of 
fuel," an “empty tank”].39
As Stiegler makes clear here, the fall (or decline from origin) not only inscribes itself as a 
possibility at the origin but in a sense also constitutes the origin of the human in its difference from 
the animal. The essence of man therefore “se fait défaut” — it defaults or makes itself lack (the 
word défaut here bearing, as the translators of the English edition of Technics and Time point out, a 
complex set of connotations including “fault” or “lack’ but also “default”).40 
Now the fall from a state of nature in Rousseau is also, signiﬁcantly for Stiegler, tied up with a 
new relation to death. For the savage does not fear death as such: ‘…the only evils he fears are pain 
and hunger. I say pain and death because an animal will never know what it is to die; the knowledge 
of death and its terrors being one of the ﬁrst acquisitions made by man in departing from an animal 
state” 41. For Rousseau the savage has an instinct of conservation but not an anticipation of death 
(“…the instinct of conservation is always, and above all, not the feeling of death”, comments 
Stiegler).42 The knowledge of death is intimately tied here, at least on Stiegler’s reading, via 
anticipation to the relationship with time in general. The savage does not fear death because he 
doesn’t anticipate—“his soul …is wholly wrapped up in the feeling of its present existence without 
any idea of the future, however near at hand”.43 Stiegler comments: “While he has “no idea of the 
future,” he nevertheless has projects, a kind of idea of an immediate future, although this is 
impossible without the whole future coming along in its stead …[the] origin is decidedly nothing 
but the almost of the origin, but here the almost is untenable”.44 As Stiegler underlines here, the 
relationship between the savage man and time brings out the tension between the transcendental 
account of originary man and reality, which can only be covered over by the teleological structure 
of the “almost” (original man has almost no idea of the future). The “almost”45 here therefore 
betrays the impossible opposition of essence and existence, the impossibility of Rousseau’s project 
(that is the desire to ﬁnd a timeless essence of man): 
Rousseau was never able to give an example of an original man originarily outside time, 
for this would be a man before creation — a nonexistent man who would yet be the only 
natural man, the only man truly himself, true to himself. The essence of man that is not 
time, that is technics: here this is manifestly the same question.46
As with freedom, as soon as the originary man is realised there must be a deviation from nature or 
the origin which is inseparable from technics: “…death, time, their originary absence and their 
arrival qua the fall itself; the appearance of man as his disappearance, the realisation of his 
possibility qua his derealisation — it is here, then, in the double of the technical and the human, or 
rather in the double question of technics and the human, that the relation between anthropology and 
technics appears as a thanatology”.47 
Having established that originary man, or the man of nature is nothing like modern man, or the 
man of culture and civilisation — inasmuch as he does not use tools, fear death and anticipate in 
general, live in communities, or experience inequality — Rousseau needs to have an account of 
how the “fall” into civility or perfectibility comes about. Since none of the later characteristics of 
modern man are natural or essential to his character, this “second origin” or the origin of modern 
man is something which comes from the exterior and deviates original man from his origin. 
Rousseau is therefore forced to consider the “many foreign causes that might never arise, and 
without which he would have remained forever in his primitive condition” and collate “the different 
accidents which may have improved the human understanding while depraving the species”.48 
Stiegler comments: 
This accidentality is witness both to the quasi-impossibility of explaining a second 
origin and to the fact that this second origin will have ended up being the origin itself  
while being but an absence of origin. It witnesses the impossibility of recognising, 
designating, and conceiving of any kind of beginning.49
The paradox of Rousseau’s transcendental anthropological account will be that by opposing the 
transcendental origin or nature of man, which “may never have existed” to any actual man 
Rousseau leaves no possibility for an account of the origin of modern man, other than as a deviation 
from origin or an absence of origin. Stiegler observes: 
Rousseau’s narrative of the origin shows us through antithesis how everything of the 
order of what is usually considered speciﬁcally human is immediately and irremediably 
linked to an absence of property [impropriété], to a process of “supplementation”, of 
prosthetisation or exteriorisation, in which nothing is any longer immediately at hand, 
where everything is instrumentalised, technicised, unbalanced.50
Paradoxically then, in his desire to exclude from the origin both any kind of technical support and 
anticipation in the form of fear of death, Rousseau nearly makes Stiegler’s thesis for him. In order 
to demonstrate that originally there is no inequality between men Rousseau is forced into a 
demonstration that at the origin (and essentially) man is nothing like man as he appears in actual 
history. Moreover, since the origin is a ﬁction, there is nothing like an actual “man of nature”. As 
soon as there is anything like a real man, man deviates from his origin (since what deﬁnes originary 
man is just the (suspended) possibility of deviation from origin). Stiegler continues: 
…the “actualisation” of the power of man seems to be as well the derealisation of man, 
his disappearance in the movement of a becoming that is no longer his own. Rousseau 
will not, therefore, have been mistaken; he will have been right, almost, for this 
narrative has set us face to face with the problem: an attempt at thinking in a single 
movement (the origin) of technics and (the “origin”) of the human — technology and 
anthropology — presupposes a radical conversion of one’s point of view.51
The accident (or second origin) by which man comes to deviate from both nature and his own origin 
is just not an origin at all, it is rather a default (défaut) of origin or lack of origin. Rousseau is 
therefore “not wrong” because, as Stiegler wants to argue, the “origin” of man is just this lack of  
origin which is what one is destined to understand as soon as one thinks that the “‘origin’ of the 
human” is tied up with the “origin of technics”. The genius of Rousseau’s account — from 
Stiegler’s point of view — is therefore that he understands that as soon as there is technics, there is 
deviation from nature and from the origin, which means that technical man (which is also, as 
Rousseau himself demonstrates, any kind of actual man) must already have deviated from the 
origin. Since what marks originary man’s difference from the animal is just the possibility of 
deviation from the origin (or what Rousseau calls perfectibility), in a certain sense the deviation 
from or disappearance of origin is already inscribed at the origin.52 That the origin of man is just the 
disappearance of origin is therefore a radical conclusion that one might draw from The Discourse  
Concerning Inequality itself. Stiegler’s aim here, however, will be to show that this problem of the 
disappearance or aporia of origin is tied to the question of technics and that, therefore, technics and 
anthropology must be thought together (even, or especially, by Rousseau). 
Now what Stiegler seems to take from the critical reading of Rousseau we have just outlined is a 
general structure by which the origin of the human is just its disappearance as origin, a point he 
underlines by placing inverted commas around the word in the phrase “‘origin” of man”. Yet he 
also underlines the fact that such an origin, non-origin or “origin” is tied to an “origin [not in 
inverted commas] of technics”. One might be entitled to wonder why the origin of technics is not 
marked by the same punctuation — is to talk of the “origin of technics” in some ways less 
problematic than to talk of the “‘origin’ of the human”? In the very next sentence, Stiegler seems to 
allay such a suspicion, as the quotes reappear when, commenting of the “radical conversion” he has 
just mentioned, he writes: “[the] question will be that of thinking the relation of being and time as a 
technological relation, if it is true that this relation only develops in the ‘originary’ horizon of 
technics — which is just as much an absence of origin”. Yet in some ways Stiegler’s phrasing here 
— “the ‘originary’ horizon of technics” — seems to underline the tension: if the horizon of technics 
really is “just as much an absence of origin’, and if the structure of technics is fundamental, i.e. the 
“relation of being and time” itself, then does it not indicate a problem with thinking the “origin” or 
the “originary” in general? As Stiegler reminded us a little earlier, ‘…the question of the possibility 
of the human, of its origin, of the possibility of an origin of the human, cannot forget the question of 
the possibility of origin as such”.53 If so, what are we to make of, or how are we to think, the “origin 
of technics” or even “an ‘originary’ horizon of technics’, with or without quotation marks? Indeed 
there seems to be a fundamental tension in Stiegler’s work between thinking technics as the absence 
of origin or as the aporia of origin (as in his reading of Rousseau here) and thinking technics as the 
origin, or as the “originary horizon” of this absence of origin (as for example when he says technics 
is constitutive of temporality). In some ways this is a quite a subtle tension: what Stiegler is 
concerned with in his reading of Rousseau is precisely bringing out this aporia of origin in the 
relationship between the human and the technical, yet at the same time there is an insistence on the 
fact that the horizon of technics is in some ways “originary” with respect to that aporia. The 
quotation marks around the word “originary” here may come to seem as subtle and signiﬁcant for 
Stiegler’s discourse as the “almost” (presque) is in Stiegler’s reading Rousseau. The question 
remains open: does Stiegler resolve the aporia of origin in Rousseau’s conjectural history by 
replacing it with technics as “originary history” or the “real” history of the origin? 
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